The problem with Libertarianism is it leans on the old Marxist adage, “You have to break a few eggs to make an omelet.” Except in this case the idea is, “A few people need to die of food poisoning before we know which diners are good.”

While this may be too much insight for one tweet, I feel it offers a unique question. Is market regulation inferior for relying upon the “breaking of a few eggs?” Are we forced to wait for harm to occur before we act to protect people? Is the government needed to protect people from being poisoned?

Well, first, everyone can acknowledge that poisoning or harming your customers is bad business. The incentive, if one hopes to honestly make a living serving food, is to protect one’s customers, otherwise a reputation will form that will dissuade newer customers. Furthermore, it is not as if one is ever allowed to negligently harm others without restitution. Tort law is almost universally accepted by modern society. If a person or business causes damage to another’s property or their person, they may be held liable even if it is not intentional.

Negligence leads to restitution, thus there is a necessary pressure that pushes restaurant owners to take care and remove possible opportunities for it to occur. Yet, accidents do occur. No business wants to pay for significant harm caused to people because of an accident. Not every business can afford to do so. So how does a business account for this?

Much the same as homeowners, where no one necessarily expects their home to be damaged, insurance provides an opportunity to guard against the worst circumstances. Businesses, like restaurants, have an incentive to be insured against tragic accidents.

On the other side of the transaction, no insurance agency wants to pay out to every business. This is why insurance firms have terms to their agreements. A car insurance company might install a tracker to make sure you stay below certain speeds. It might require maintenance on your vehicle.

Much the same, the insurers of a restaurant may make similar demands: inspections, certain equipment, specific cleanings. All the same requirements without a possibly politically motivated inspector. Political regulation mechanisms fall victim to regulatory capture. Those already established businesses can lobby the regulatory body to favor them over new competitors or increase the cost of compliance. Political favoritism begins to trump true quality control.

Political regulation is subject to problems that market regulation is subject to now. In an insurance model, the insurer is incentivized to maximize revenue through allowing more businesses to be insured and paying out as little as possible, taking measures to minimize risk claims. Thus, the natural market mechanisms will minimize risk of damage.

This is contrary to the government regulatory model. The regulatory model may have requirements and infrequent inspections, but it often falls victim to the very thing thrown into question. Regulatory agencies treat issues in fines. Insurance firms deal in acceptance of payment and promise of coverage. A regulatory agency will often only shut down a firm after its failings—after an accident or negligence has occurred. In many cases, a “few eggs have to break” to deal with problems.

An insurance system is entirely preemptive. An insurance firm does not want to pay out in any circumstances. It will not insure a business that does not meet its requirements. That business will not be able to operate or it will lose everything as a result. An insurance system is not easily bribable, because if it lowers its standards then it will pay out at a massive scale to the barely compliant. Why be a customer at a noninsured business? The insurance system succeeds where regulatory systems fail.

However, there is also a demand-side protection for consumers. Look only at websites like Yelp or reviews on Google Maps. Poor experiences are shared every day, ensuring that customers only visit the highest-quality restaurants. Cleanliness matters to consumers just as much as producers. So, it naturally follows they will demand evidence of cleanliness and safety before they accept food. That is where rating agencies, much like insurance firms, enter to certify cleanliness. Firms, to win concerned consumers over, might pay these rating agencies to review their restaurants.

Of course, they might cheat. The check, however, is that the rating agency may become untrusted and go out of business should it be found out they are deceptive. A regulatory agency like the Food and Drug Administration or United States Department of Agriculture cannot go out of business and as a result fall victim to regulatory capture and corruption.

The market, ultimately, is far more efficient than any regulatory agency in protecting consumers. Agencies that provide information are just as beholden to consumers and consumer safety as the firms they rate. Regulatory agencies lack proper oversight or accountability to provide the same information correctly. Regulatory agencies allow people to be lulled into a false sense of security when there is every reason to doubt the agency itself. It has no reason to operate efficiently or in the light of day. Market mechanisms do not have this defect. They are forced to be vigilant, attentive, efficient, and preemptive. Failures reflect on revenue, and revenue is life in the market.

We need not crack any eggs at all. The market doesn’t ask that of us. Regulatory agencies allow eggs to fall through their fingers, and when the yolk scatters on the floor the hand isn’t punished. The invisible hand of the market is far steadier and safer.

About the Author

David Brady is a Catholic libertarian and economics and finance undergraduate student at Florida Southern College. He is a co-host of the “Every Week is Chaos” podcast and a Mises Apprentice.

This tale is meant to show the supposed failures of laissez-faire capitalism, with its disregard for workers and health. Readers are supposed to walk away with a firm belief in the need for the regulation of these firms. Hurrah! Here comes the mighty state to provide safety to the masses that would otherwise be made sick by crony corporations. That’s far from the truth.

Murray Rothbard himself documents in The Progressive Era the truth of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulation. Rothbard observed that nearly every inspection passed in any form of legislature or bureaucracy was fueled by protectionism from existing firms. These regulations were not there to provide “safety” to consumers but rather to keep competition out of the marketplace by fiat. Rothbard states that the only meaningful definition of monopoly is an exclusive legal right granted by the state. Perhaps then, the only meaningful definition of so-called monopoly powers is a firm’s ability to push regulation that harms their competition through the state.

Even today, the USDA—and its regulations—threaten to crush small farmers under its heel. A small hobby farm, or even one that simply isn’t a factory farm, can hardly stand up to the regulations.

Meat processing in the United States must be done under the supervision of a USDA inspector if the goal is to sell the animal product to another person. A farmer cannot simply butcher his or her own animal, cut it into the usual meat products, and sell it at a farm stand. That would violate USDA regulations. Regardless of the ability of farmers to inspect and keep their own animals healthy or of their own skill in butchering livestock, they must have a USDA inspector to sell the product on the market.

This inspector is not provided, though, free of charge by the USDA through taxpayer dollars. Rather, the individual meat processor must pay out of pocket for these services. As far as meat processing goes, the USDA charges anywhere from $86 to $238 an hour for inspections. This does not guarantee the quality of the meat; it simply gives a rubber stamp to large processors that can afford to pay the processors.

Bigger is not necessarily better, as one can apply basic logic to the inspection process. Those moving larger volumes of meat are able to afford to pay an inspector hourly. By throwing large volumes of the goods over and over in a constant stream at their workers and the inspectors, mistakes can be made. This method of “inspection” incentivizes for large volumes rather than quality. It’s rare to come across a small farm causing health issues, but it has become increasingly common to come across recalls from large processors like Perdue and Lakeside Refrigerated. These large outlets can certainly afford to pay for an inspector, but that doesn’t guarantee quality.

The solution is, rather than increase the scale of operations, America must decentralize its meat packing and processing. This means opposing bureaucracy that forces family operations to pay for a bureaucrat who guarantees neither safety nor quality.

In a free market, quality and safety can be ensured by a variety of means. An organization like the USDA might arise, but it would be held accountable by profits and losses. Individual processing firms may pay the free-market USDA to verify the health of their product. However, if the free-market USDA fails to stop an illness from arising, through their own inspection failures, they may lose their credibility with both consumers and the producers that pay them. Profit and loss provide greater incentives for success than a bureaucracy that theoretically cannot “go under.”

Even better is the decentralization of the food processing industry altogether. Greater accountability can be held to more local institutions, such as farmers currently barred from processing their own food. Word of mouth spreads quickly among neighbors. Any exchange that a consumer is comfortable making, they should be allowed to, knowing full well the risks. Why should a government get between a farmer and their customer buying meat from them?

This is the entire basis for Thomas Massie’s Processing Revival and Intrastate Meat Exemption Act, or PRIME Act, which would circumvent the USDA’s jurisdiction for exchanges at a community level. The act would exempt custom slaughterhouses from USDA inspector requirements if the exchange occurs within state borders and follows any state-specific laws. It would be an important step toward decentralizing the food system.

If conservatives and libertarians care about competition for small farms, they should support defanging the federal bureaucracy used by large corporations to capture markets. The USDA should have its regulatory powers removed, and the ability to provide safety in food should be returned to the market. Markets provide a far more welcoming place for producers and a far safer result for consumers.

About the Author

David Brady is a Catholic libertarian and economics and finance undergraduate student at Florida Southern College. He is a co-host of the “Econphonics” podcast and a Mises Apprentice.

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