But we shouldn’t worry about bank runs because the government is here to help. In the US, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures checking accounts up to $250,000, and the banking system is regulated by a host of agencies, including the Federal Reserve, which also acts as a lender of last resort. These measures are intended to prevent and mitigate bank runs for the benefit of both the banks and their depositors. Though it should be obvious that they only conceal the fundamental problem and disperse the costs.

Murray Rothbard was a detractor of fractional reserve banking. He wrote on the changing legal definition of bank deposits—how they originated as warehousing relationships, or “bailments,” but over time came to represent debtor-creditor relationships. Ludwig von Mises also pointed to bank issues of fiduciary media (the proportion of deposits that cannot be redeemed), which artificially lower interest rates, as the cause of business cycles.

Nevertheless, a faction of Austrian and Austrian-adjacent scholars defends fractional reserve banking, saying that not only can it be sustainable, but it can also be beneficial in maintaining monetary equilibrium. I’m not convinced by this view, but it’s worth taking a closer look at one point that these scholars often make. They say that clear communication between the bank and its customers would solve the hairy problem of bank customers expecting the money at par on demand.

With such an agreement, “fractional reserve free banking” proponents say, depositors would know that they are effectively creditors to the bank and that the bank is therefore a debtor to them. This means that the deposits are technically and legally owned by the bank and that what the depositor has is technically and legally a callable loan to the bank. Clear agreements would mean that depositors understand that there is a chance that they won’t be able to get their money (actually, the bank’s money, in this view) immediately in the event of a bank failure. Of course, central banking and government-backed deposit insurance diminish customers’ expectation of bank responsibility—how much should banks be expected to disclose about the deposit relationship if most of their customers’ deposits are guaranteed by the government anyway?

In line with other fractional reserve free banking proponents, George Selgin argues that modern depositor agreements—the dense legalese most people skip—already establish this transparency.

And he is right. Bank of America does make that disclaimer in its deposit agreement. I decided to take a closer look at other big banks’ fine print to see how standard this language is. What I found is that it isn’t standard and that even when a bank (including Bank of America) does use that language, it is still ambiguous because of other language in the document, especially in regard to the availability of funds. One bank’s fine print doesn’t even mention the possibility of bank failure and FDIC receivership.

Here is what I found.

JPMorgan Chase does not have debtor-creditor language. In fact, in the first section of the agreement, in which common terms are defined, it says that the “available balance” is “the amount of money in your account that you can use right now.” This does not indicate that Chase “owes” its customers the money or that withdrawals could be delayed. Chase explicitly calls its deposit customers “account owners” and say they have “complete control over all of the funds in the account.”

Bank of America describes the deposit relationship as “that of debtor and creditor,” but this language does not appear in its online banking service agreement, which only says that the online “Services may also be affected by your Deposit Agreement.” Bank of America doesn’t say much about the availability of demand deposits but is very clear about time deposits: “When you open a time deposit account, you agree to leave your funds in the account until the maturity date of the account.”

Wells Fargo does not use the debtor-creditor language to describe its deposit relationship. Like Bank of America, Wells Fargo says that account owners have “complete control over all of the funds in the account.”

Citibank very clearly defines its relationship with customers: “Citibank’s relationship with you is debtor and creditor.” But Citi also refers to the customer’s balance as the “‘Available Now’ balance,” even though a critical mass of depositors could run to withdraw their funds and find that the money isn’t so available.

US Bank does not use the debtor-creditor language to describe the deposit relationship. In fact, early in the agreement it refers to the “Owner’s Authority” of depositors, which includes “the power to perform all the transactions available to the account.” US Bank also says that the customer’s funds are available immediately: “‘Available Balance’ means the amount of money that can be withdrawn at a point in time.”

PNC does not use the debtor-creditor language to describe the deposit relationship. It does not even have a section on the possibility of bank failure and the process of FDIC receivership, which is in all the above banks’ deposit agreements.

So, only two of these six major banks have the debtor-creditor language, and the two that do have it introduce ambiguity by promising at-par-on-demand availability of funds. We are still a long way from clear communication about the status of depositors’ money, if we can call it theirs at all.

About the Author

Dr. Jonathan Newman is a Fellow at the Mises Institute. He earned his PhD at Auburn University while a Research Fellow at the Mises Institute. He was the recipient of the 2021 Gary G. Schlarbaum Award to a Promising Young Scholar for Excellence in Research and Teaching. Previously, he was Associate Professor of Economics and Finance at Bryan College. He has published in the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics and in volumes edited by Matthew McCaffrey and Per Bylund. His research focuses on Austrian economics, inflation and business cycles, and the history of economic thought. He has taught courses on Macroeconomics and Quantitative Economics: Uses and Limitations in the Mises Graduate School. He is the author of two children’s books: The Broken Window and Ludwig the Builder. His commentary appears regularly in the Mises Wire and Power & Market.

The term has a ring to it that signals support for progressive goals. “Inclusion” is part of the Orwellian trio of terms “diversity, inclusion, and equity,” which, as Dr. Michael Rectenwald writes, means “surveillance, punishment of the ‘privileged,’ sacrifice of national citizens to global interests, and the labeling as ‘dangerous’ and marking for (virtual) elimination those supposed members or leaders of ‘hate groups’ who oppose such measures.” The central banks’ use of “financial inclusion” involves the same reversal of meanings.

Financial Inclusion and Unbanked Households

Consider that a retail CBDC would be like having a bank account with the Federal Reserve, even if it is intermediated by another bank. There is a lot of guesswork about how a CBDC will be implemented, but some say that it will not just be like having a bank account with the Fed, but that it could be exactly that.

Either way, if a CBDC were genuinely aimed at financial inclusion, it would offer something to those who have chosen to forgo a bank account entirely. This “unbanked” population constitutes about 5.4 percent of US households according to a 2021 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) survey. The survey asked each household why they do not have a bank account, and the responses indicate that minimum balance requirements, privacy, trust, and fees are the most significant factors.

Figure 1: Unbanked households’ reasons for not having a bank account, 2021 (percent)

The critical question, then, is this: what does a CBDC offer these households that physical cash and other nonbank financial services (e.g., check cashing, money orders, prepaid cards) do not?

Privacy (or Lack Thereof)

A CBDC undermines privacy. Whatever a central bank might say about privacy protection with a CBDC can be safely dismissed. The Fed paper, for example, says, “Protecting consumer privacy is critical. Any CBDC would need to strike an appropriate balance, however, between safeguarding the privacy rights of consumers and affording the transparency necessary to deter criminal activity.” We should not conflate the characteristics of a CBDC with those of cryptocurrencies in general, which offer anonymity and pseudonymity to their users.

Consider how the IRS recently pried open PayPal, Venmo, and Cash App accounts with transactions over $600. Consider also that the Supreme Court just ruled that the IRS can investigate your bank accounts without notification in some circumstances, including if you are a friend, family member, or associate of someone who owes the IRS.

Beyond taxes, banks also willingly hand over personal information (even without a warrant or formal request) to the FBI. This data, which includes previous firearm purchases, belongs to people who show up at the wrong protest or who were merely in the vicinity as the data is collected based on transactions within a specific geographic area.

The lack of privacy with bank accounts certainly contributes to the distrust people have for banks, as noted in the survey. This shows that “financial inclusion” is a mere buzzword as there is nothing about a CBDC that would gain the trust of unbanked households, who are not excluded from the banking system but actively avoid it.

Fees and Negative Interest Rates

According to the survey, fees are another commonly cited reason for being unbanked. People avoid banks because the fees are steep and unpredictable.

Although there is no certainty regarding how a CBDC would operate, many see that it could finally offer the holy grail of monetary policy: the ability to impose negative interest rates. In effect, this would be a fee for holding a CBDC.

After the 2008 crash, the Fed reached the “zero lower bound” for nominal interest rates. They were unable to stimulate more spending through their interest rate targeting approach. While there were a few outlandish ideas about imposing a negative interest rate on cash, like the idea of Greg Mankiw’s student to remove the legal tender status of all currency with a serial number ending in a randomly selected digit, it is just too difficult to impose a fee on the cash in your wallet or safe.

With a digital currency, it becomes effortless, especially if the use of physical cash is significantly diminished or even eliminated altogether. The monetary policy authorities would simply press a button and deduct a certain amount of CBDC from everyone’s accounts. Think of the spending they would encourage if everybody knew their unspent money would be subject to such a penalty!

Conclusion

The “financial inclusion” rhetoric in central bank papers and speeches on CBDCs is laughable. Presently, people avoid banks because they distrust banks, value privacy, and despise fees. A CBDC wouldn’t help with any of these concerns. Instead of promoting inclusion, a CBDC would become the ultimate tool for financial intrusion and control.

The tyrannical potential is not a secret, even for the army of technocrats pushing for CBDCs. At a recent World Economic Forum event in China, Eswar Prasad matter-of-factly brandished the inevitable weaponization of CBDCs:

And one final note that I’ll make is that if you think about the benefits of digital money, there are huge potential gains. It’s not just about digital forms of physical currency—you can have programmability, units of central bank currency with expiry dates. You could have, as I argue in my book, a potentially better, or some people might say, darker world, where the government decides that units of central bank money can be used to purchase some things, but not other things that it deems less desirable, like, say, ammunition or drugs or pornography or something of the sort. And that is very powerful in terms of the use of a CBDC.

Of course, any moral qualms we have regarding the items he listed are irrelevant. It is clear that the state will use CBDCs to push us toward anything the state favors and away from anything the state doesn’t. Programmable money means programmable citizens.

About the Author

Dr. Jonathan Newman is a Fellow at the Mises Institute. He earned his PhD at Auburn University while a Research Fellow at the Mises Institute. He was the recipient of the 2021 Gary G. Schlarbaum Award to a Promising Young Scholar for Excellence in Research and Teaching. His research focuses on Austrian economics, inflation and business cycles, and the history of economic thought. He has taught courses on Macroeconomics and Quantitative Economics: Uses and Limitations in the Mises Graduate School.

When banks practice this kind of maturity mismatch—potentially immediate-term liabilities (deposits) backed by long-term assets (loans and Treasury securities), it is called “fractional reserve banking.”

The failure of SVB and other recent bank crises have reignited the debate over fractional reserve banking. While Austrian economists across the board are critical of central banking and government manipulation of the money supply and interest rates, there are differences of opinion on fractional reserve banking. Murray Rothbard was firmly against the practice for both economic and ethical reasons; however, “fractional reserve free bankers” (FRFB) like George Selgin and Larry White have written extensively about how fractional reserve banking per se does not make for an inherently unstable banking system and does not cause business cycles. The FRFB position is that the business cycles and instability are caused by government interference, primarily via central bank monetary policy.

To understand how fractional reserve banks operate, we first need to make a distinction between warehouse banking and loan banking. Warehouse banking refers to the way banks accept deposits and act on instructions from the depositor to send or withdraw money at par on demand. In warehouse banking, there is no multiplication of deposits or creation of credit—the bank simply stores, or “warehouses,” depositors’ cash. Importantly, depositors have to pay a fee for this service at warehousing banks.

Loan banking refers to the way banks can act as financial intermediaries. A bank customer can purchase a certificate of deposit or other time deposit that, importantly, represents a parting with funds. The customer cannot access these funds for spending or withdrawing. The bank uses these funds to extend loans. The interest earned on these loans is shared (according to the contract) between the bank, which administered and intermediated, and the customer, who relinquished the money. Here, there is also no multiplication of deposits, expansion of the money supply, or creation of credit ex nihilo.

The issues with fractional reserve banking come from combining these two functions: warehouse banking and loan banking. Banks combine these functions by using demand deposits (which depositors can withdraw at par on demand) as a basis for extending loans. Hopefully, the potential problems with this are obvious: What if depositors request more money than the bank has on hand, due to the fact that not all deposits have matching cash reserves, but instead are backed by long-term loans?

This is exactly what happened to SVB. Depositors wanted to withdraw more cash than the bank had in reserves. SVB had used depositors’ funds to purchase Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities, and to extend loans to high-tech firms. SVB might have had less foresight than other banks, but it is important to note that all banks do this sort of thing. No bank keeps 100 percent reserves—no bank keeps its warehousing and intermediation functions separate. In fact, in 2017 the Federal Reserve blocked a new bank that intended to be such a safe haven for depositors.

The repeated bank runs and associated financial crises caused by fractional reserve banking have led to the creation of central banking, government deposit insurance, a multitude of bank regulations, and a host of agencies to design and enforce these regulations. It’s worth pointing out, however, that if the government simply ignored bank runs, then the standard mechanisms of profit and loss would be at work. Banks would fail in the same way other private businesses fail. Potential bank customers would avoid unsound banks and flock to sound banks according to their own preferences and expectations. This prospect leads the FRFB crowd to conclude that fractional reserve banking per se isn’t a problem—it is the moral hazard and money creation by the government that causes all the problems.

In my view, the debates over the sustainability and ethics of fractional reserve banking suffer from poorly defined terms. If a deposit is defined as “redeemable at par on demand,” then that constitutes a promise by the bank to have the funds available at par on demand, meaning no loans are purchased with those funds. If a contract stipulates that the bank will offer accounts for which deposits are defined as such but then uses the funds to provide loans, then the bank is in breach of contract. If, however, the bank and the customer agree on a looser definition of the term “deposit,” such that deposits are not always redeemable at par, or are redeemable at par but sometimes with a delay, then that is their prerogative. It seems to me that such an arrangement is more properly called an “unsecured callable loan” and that if these coexisted with true, fully backed deposits on the market, the callable loans would trade at a discount against the fully backed deposits.

I also think that the debates over the sustainability and ethics of FRFB are less important than the economic consequences of fractional reserve banking. No matter what the fine print in a deposit agreement says (and the language is not standard, by the way), if depositors view their checking account balances as one-to-one money substitutes, then prices and spending patterns will reflect the depositors’ own net worth calculations and expectations of disposable income. If a bank expands credit on top of that via fractional reserve banking, then the supply of credit and interest rates no longer reflect the depositors’ underlying real savings and rates of time preference. This wedge is what triggers the boom-bust cycle.

This brings us back to the addict analogy. Suppose an addict had the ability to magically create, ex nihilo, his own stimulating drug, as fractional reserve banks can do with money and credit. Suppose that the negative side effects of using the drug could be spread to all other members of society, as central banks and government deposit insurance allow for fractional reserve banks. Would you expect moderation? Would you expect healthy outcomes? Or would you expect an endless cycle of highs and crashes?

About the Author

Dr. Jonathan Newman is an Associate Professor of Economics and Finance at Bryan College and a Fellow at the Mises Institute. He earned his PhD at Auburn University while a Research Fellow at the Mises Institute. He was the recipient of the 2021 Gary G. Schlarbaum Award to a Promising Young Scholar for Excellence in Research and Teaching. His research focuses on Austrian economics, inflation and business cycles, and the history of economic thought. He has taught courses on Macroeconomics and Quantitative Economics: Uses and Limitations in the Mises Graduate School.

Article cross-posted from Mises.